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Since John von Neumann suggested utilizing Logistic map as a random number generator in
1947, a great number of encryption schemes based on Logistic map and/or its variants have
been proposed. This paper re-evaluates the security of an image cipher based on transformed
logistic maps and proves that the image cipher can be deciphered efficiently under two different
conditions: 1) two pairs of known plain-images and the corresponding cipher-images with com-
putational complexity of O(218 +L); 2) two pairs of chosen plain-images and the corresponding
cipher-images with computational complexity of O(L), where L is the number of pixels in the
plain-image. In contrast, the required condition in the previous deciphering method is eighty-
seven pairs of chosen plain-images and the corresponding cipher-images with computational
complexity of O(27 + L). In addition, three other security flaws existing in most Logistic-map-
based ciphers are also reported.
Keywords: chaotic image encryption; cryptanalysis; known-plaintext attack; chosen-plaintext
attack; Logistic map.
1. Introduction
In the cyber era facing 5G (5th generation) mobile networks, all kinds of security problems about image
data are encountering serious challenges [Li & Lo, 2011; Li et al., 2015]. The seeming similarity between
chaos and cryptography promoted their combination to design efficient and secure encryption schemes,
1
ar
X
iv
:1
40
4.
36
00
v3
  [
cs
.C
R]
  3
0 S
ep
 20
16
October 5, 2018 23:54 TLM
2 C. Li et al.
where one or more chaotic systems were adopted to determine position permutation relationship [Chen
et al., 2004; Fridrich, 1998], generate pseudo-random number sequence (PRNS) [Mao et al., 2004; Zhu, 2012;
Zheng et al., 2014; Zhou et al., 2015], produce cipher-text directly [Baptista, 1998] and construct public key
encryption scheme [Bose, 2005]. As an integral part of cryptology, security analysis on a given encryption
scheme checks its real capability on achieving balance point between security and the cost computational,
and also provides another perspective on studying property of the underlying theory [Knuth, 1985; A´lvarez
& Li, 2006]. Some cryptanalytic works have shown that many chaos-based encryption schemes have security
problems of different extents from modern cryptographical point of view [A´lvarez et al., 2004; Chen et al.,
2006; Solak et al., 2010; Li & Lo, 2011; Li et al., 2013a,b].
Logistic map is one of the most famous chaotic systems. It comes from discrete quadratic recurrence
form of the Logistic equation, a model of population growth first published by P. Verhulst in 1845. The
application of Logistic map in cryptology can be traced back to John von Neumann’s suggestion on utilizing
it as a random number generator in 1947 [Ulam & von Neumann, 1947]. The map becomes very popular
after the biologist Robert May used it as a discrete-time demographic model in 1976 [MAY, 1976]. Due to
simple form and relatively complex dynamical properties of Logistic map, it was extensively used to design
encryption schemes or generate PRNS [Baptista, 1998; Phatak & Rao, 1995; Kocarev & Jakimoski, 2001;
Jakimoski & Kocarev, 2001]. Even in Web of Science, one can find that more than two hundred papers on
application of Logistic map in cryptography were published between 1998 and 2014. Among them, a few
papers reported some security deficiencies specially caused by Logistic map, such as estimation of control
parameter from neighboring states [Li et al., 2008], short period of the states orbit [Persohn & Povinelli,
2012; Li et al., 2012], stable distribution of estimation error of the control parameter [Li et al., 2014]. To
tackle the flaws, various remedies were proposed, such as modify Logistic map itself [Sam et al., 2012] or
postprocess the raw chaotic states [Li et al., 2012].
In [Sam et al., 2012], a novel image cipher based on mixed transformed Logistic maps (MTLM) was pro-
posed, where the modulo addition and the XOR operations are employed in diffusion procedure, which are
all controlled by PRNS generated by iterating MTLM. Essentially, the image cipher falls in the categories
of encryption schemes based on function
y = (αu x)⊕ (β u x), (1)
where y, α, β, and x are n-bit non-negative integers, α u x = (α + x) mod 2n, and ⊕ denotes the
eXclusive OR (XOR) operation. Detailed cryptographic properties of Eq. (1) have been given in [Li et al.,
2013b]. Recently, YS Zhang et al. found that the cipher is insecure against chosen-plaintext attack and the
equivalent secret key can be obtained by eighty-seven pairs of chosen plain-images [Zhang et al., 2014].
This paper re-evaluates the security of the image cipher proposed in [Sam et al., 2012], and points out
the following main insecurity issues: 1) the deciphering performance of the chosen-plaintext attack can be
further improved, in terms of both the number of required plaintexts and computationalal complexity; 2)
the cipher can be broken efficiently with only two pairs of known plain-images and their corresponding
cipher-images; 3) the image cipher suffers other security flaws like insensitivity with respect to change of
plain-image/secret key and weak randomness of the used PRNS.
The remaining of the paper is organized as follows. The next section gives a brief introduction of the
image cipher under study. Then, the comprehensive cryptanalyses on it are presented in Sec. 3, together
with some experimental results. Finally, the last section concludes the paper.
2. Description of the image cipher under study
The plain-image of the image cipher under study is a RGB color image of size H ×W (height × width),
which can be represented as an 8-bit integer matrix of size 3× L, I = {I(i)}Li=1 = {(R(i), G(i), B(i))}Li=1,
by scanning the pixels in the raster order, where L = H ·W . Similarly, the corresponding cipher-image is
denoted by I′ = {I ′(i)}Li=1 = {(R′(i), G′(i), B′(i))}Li=1. Then, the four main parts of the image cipher under
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study are described as follows1.
• The secret key is composed of six odd integers {ru}6u=1 and three control parameters k1, k2, k3, initial state
(x0, y0, z0) of MTLM proposed in [Sam et al., 2012], which is given as
xi+1 = (3.735 · k1 · (1 + xi)2 · sin(1/(1 + y2i ))) mod 1,
yi+1 = (3.536 · k2 · xi+1 · sin(xi+1 · yi)(1 + z2i )) mod 1,
zi+1 = (3.838 · k3 · xi+1 · (1 + yi+1 · zi)) mod 1,
where ru ∈ [0, 256], |k1| > 37.7, |k2| > 39.7 and |k3| > 37.2.
• Keystream generation procedure: Iterate the above MTLM L times to obtain a chaotic states sequence
{(xi, yi, zi)}Li=1. Then, generate keystream as follows: for i = 1 ∼ L, set
Xi = b256 · xic,
Yi = b256 · yic,
Zi = b256 · zic,
where bxc quantizes x to the nearest integer less than or equal to x.
• The encryption procedure consists of the following three operations.
– Initial permutation: For i = 1 ∼ H, j = 1 ∼W , set
R†((i− 1) ·W + j) = R((t1 − 1) ·W + t2),
G†((i− 1) ·W + j) = G((t3 − 1) ·W + t4),
B†((i− 1) ·W + j) = B((t5 − 1) ·W + t6),
(2)
where
tu =
{
1 + (31 · i · ru) mod H, if u ∈ {1, 3, 5};
1 + (31 · j · ru) mod W, otherwise,
i.e., tu is a function of i or j according to the value of u.
– Nonlinear diffusion: For i = 1 ∼ L, set
R‡(i) =
((
R†(i) ≫ 4
)
uXi
)⊕ Yi,
G‡(i) =
((
G†(i) ≫ 4
)
uXi
)⊕ Yi,
B‡(i) =
((
B†(i) ≫ 4
)
uXi
)⊕ Yi, (3)
where a≫ 4 = 16 · (a mod 16) + ba/16c.
– Zigzag diffusion: 1) re-scan all pixels of I‡ = {I‡(i)}Li=1 =
{
(R‡(i), G‡(i), B‡(i))
}L
i=1
in the zigzag order
and still store the result with I‡; 2) encrypt each element of I‡ in order by
R′(i) = R‡(i)⊕R′(i− 1)⊕ Zi,
G′(i) = G‡(i)⊕G′(i− 1)⊕ Zi,
B′(i) = B‡(i)⊕B′(i− 1)⊕ Zi,
(4)
where R′(0) = G′(0) = B′(0) = 0.
• Decryption procedure is similar to the encryption one except the following points:
– the above encryption operations are run in a reverse order;
1To simplify the description of the image cipher under study, some notations in the original paper [Sam et al., 2012] are
modified under the condition that the essential form kept unchanged.
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– Eqs. (2), (3) and (4) are replaced by
R((t1 − 1) ·W + t2) = R†((i− 1) ·W + j),
G((t3 − 1) ·W + t4) = G†((i− 1) ·W + j),
B((t5 − 1) ·W + t6) = B†((i− 1) ·W + j),
R†(i) =
(((
R‡(i)⊕ Yi
)−Xi) mod 256)≫ 4,
G†(i) =
(((
G‡(i)⊕ Yi
)−Xi) mod 256)≫ 4,
B†(i) =
(((
B‡(i)⊕ Yi
)−Xi) mod 256)≫ 4, (5)
and 
R‡(i) = R′(i)⊕R′(i− 1)⊕ Zi,
G‡(i) = G′(i)⊕G′(i− 1)⊕ Zi,
B‡(i) = B′(i)⊕B′(i− 1)⊕ Zi,
(6)
respectively.
Observing Eqs. (5), (6), one can see that sequences {Xi}Li=1 and {Yi⊕Zi}Li=1 are the equivalent key of the
two cascaded parts, Nonlinear diffusion and Zigzag diffusion.
3. Cryptanalysis
To make cryptanalysis on the image cipher under study more complete, we first briefly review previous
deciphering method proposed by Zhang et al. Then, a best improvement of the attack is presented in
Sec. 3.2. Furthermore, we proposed an effective known-plaintext attack in Sec. 3.3. Finally, some security
flaws of the scheme are presented.
3.1. Chosen-plaintext attack proposed by Zhang et al.
Chosen-plaintext attack is an attack model assuming that the attacker owns right to modify plaintext and
observes the corresponding ciphertext. Assume a plain-image I1 = {I1(i)}Li=1 = {(R1(i), G1(i), B(i))}Li=1
and its corresponding cipher-image I′1 = {I ′1(i)}Li=1 = {(R′1(i), G′1(i), B′1(i))}Li=1 are available. Obviously,
any permutation operation become invalid with respect to permutation object of a fixed value. To decipher
the three encryption operations with the strategy of Divide and Conquer, the plain-image is chosen as
I1 = {(R1(i) ≡ 0, G1(i) ≡ d,B(i))}Li=1, where d ∈ {0, . . . , 255}. According to Eqs. (3) and (4), one has
R′1(i)⊕R′1(i− 1) = Xi ⊕ Yi ⊕ Zi, (7)
and
G′1(i)⊕G′1(i− 1) = ((d≫ 4)uXi)⊕ Yi ⊕ Zi. (8)
Incorporate (Yi ⊕ Zi) in Eq. (7) into Eq. (8), one further has
R′1(i)⊕R′1(i− 1)⊕G′1(i)⊕G′1(i− 1) = ((d≫ 4)uXi)⊕Xi. (9)
The above equation can be attributed to a special case of Eq. (1),
y = (αu x)⊕ x.
As shown in Table 2 of [Li et al., 2013b], only the scope of possible values of Xi can be obtained by solving
one set of Eq. (9). Given more pairs of chosen plain-images and the corresponding cipher-images, the scope
would become more and more narrow, and all the seven least significant bits of Xi may be confirmed. In
[Zhang et al., 2014], Zhang et al. claimed that 256 plain-images of different fixed values can reveal {Xi}Li=1
(As the relation shown in Eq. (11), the most significant bit of Xi is ignored). As a RGB color image has
three channel components, one can conclude that the chaotic keystream {Xi}Li=1 can be reconstructed with
d256/3e = 86 pairs of chosen plain-images. Then, the keystream {Yi ⊕ Zi}Li=1 can be obtained by Eq. (7).
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Then, only the Initial permutation is left. One can use one more chosen plain-image, e.g., modified version
of any previous chosen-image by changing one single pixel value, to recover the parameters of the position
permutation part, {ru}6u=1, via Eq. (2).
In all, the essential idea of Zhang et al.’s attack is to narrow the scope of x by verifying Eq. (1) of β ≡ 0
with different sets of (y, α). As y ∈ [0, 255], they enumerate all possible values of α ∈ [0, 127], and then
recover x by observing the distribution of y. So, the required number of chosen plain-image is eighty-seven
and the computational complexity is O(128 · L).
3.2. Optimum chosen-plaintext attack
Based on the above discussion, this subsection presents an improved chosen-plaintext attack based on the
following proposition.
Proposition 1. Assume that α, β, and x are all n-bit integers, then a lower bound on the number of queries
(α, β) to solve Eq. (1) in terms of modulo 2n−1 for any x is 1 if n = 2; 2 if n > 2.
Following the above Proposition, a corollary listed two typical sets of (α, β) to determine x in Eq. (1)
when n = 8, where the two queries are (0, 170) and (170, 85). Thus, one can choose a plain-image I =
{(R(i) ≡ 0, G(i) ≡ 170, B(i)) ≡ 85}Li=1, and then one further has
R′(i)⊕R′(i− 1)⊕G′(i)⊕G′(i− 1) =
(0uXi)⊕ (170uXi) ,
G′(i)⊕G′(i− 1)⊕B′(i)⊕B′(i− 1) =
(170uXi)⊕ (85uXi) ,
from Eqs. (3) and (4). Thus, {Xi}Li=1 can be revealed with the above chosen plain-image. Once {Xi}Li=1 is
recovered, only one more chosen plain-image is required to break Initial permutation as above. Therefore,
the equivalent key of the image cipher under study can be revealed with only two chosen plain-images and
the computational complexity of the improved chosen-plaintext attack is only O(L). As shown in [Li et al.,
2013b], it is impossible to solve x of most values in Eq. (1) with only one set of (α, β). So, this attack
method can be considered as optimum.
3.3. Known-plaintext attack
The known-plaintext attack is a weaker version of the chosen-plaintext attack as the attacker can not
modify the plaintext. So, the former is more important for security analysis.
Assume another plain-image I2 = {I2(i)}Li=1 = {(R2(i), G2(i), B2(i))}Li=1, and the corresponding
cipher-image I′2 = {I ′2(i)}Li=1 = {(R′2(i), G′2(i), B′2(i))}Li=1, are available. According to Eqs. (3) and (4),
one has
R′1(i) ⊕ R′1(i − 1) ⊕ R′2(i) ⊕ R′2(i − 1) =
((
R†1(i) ≫ 4
)
uXi
)
⊕
((
R†2(i) ≫ 4
)
uXi
)
. (10)
Referring to Proposition 2 in [Li et al., 2013a], one has
(au (Xi ⊕ 128)) = (auXi)⊕ 128. (11)
Thus, one can see that Xi is equivalent to (Xi⊕128) in terms of existence of Eq. (10). According to Eq. (2),
one has
R†(i ·W ) = R(ui),
where ui = (((31 · i · r1) mod H) ·W + 1) and i ∈ {1, . . . ,H}. Referring to Eq. (10), one further has
R′1(i ·W )⊕R′1(i ·W − 1)⊕R′2(i ·W )⊕R′2(i ·W − 1) =(
(R1(ui) ≫ 4)uX(i·W )
)⊕ ((R2(ui) ≫ 4)uX(i·W )) . (12)
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As r1 is an odd integer and r1 ∈ [0, 256], there are only 128 possible values. Thus, one can enumerate the
possible values of r1 and then verify them by checking whether X(i·W ) ∈ {0, . . . , 127} satisfies Eq. (12) for
any i ∈ {1, · · · , H}. If all the verifications pass, the remaining value of r1 is considered as the right sub-
key. Apparently, the computational complexity of the search procedure is O(128 ×H × 128) = O(214H),
and the success of this method is determined by the verification of Eq. (12). The probability of (α, β)
passing verification of Eq. (1) under different values of y are shown in Fig. 1. Assume that the elements of
{R1(i ·W + 1)}Hi=1, and {R2(i ·W + 1)}Hi=1 follow uniform distribution, one can assure that the probability
of a wrong version of r1 passing the verification procedure is less than (1/2)
H , which means the value of
r1 can be successfully recovered with only three times verification with an extremely high probability. In
the same way, we can obtain other five odd integers {ri}6i=2. Therefore, the computational complexity of
deciphering the Initial permutation is O(6× 128× 3× 128) = O(9 · 215) .= O(218).
0 15 31 63 127 143 159 191 255
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
0.3
0.35
0.4
0.45
0.5
y
Fig. 1. The probability of (α, β) passing verification of Eq. (1) under different values of y.
Once the permutation part has been deciphered, some bits of {Xi}Li=1 can be revealed with even one
pair of known plain-image and the corresponding cipher-image. In the current situation, Eq. (9) is replaced
by
R′(i)⊕R′(i− 1)⊕G′(i)⊕G′(i− 1) =
((
R†(i) ≫ 4
)
uXi
)
⊕
((
G†(i) ≫ 4
)
uXi
)
.
Obviously, the above equation falls in the general form of Eq. (1). In [Li et al., 2013b, Sec. 3.2], Li et
al. proved that Pr(0) = 0.5, Pr(1) = 0.4062, Pr(2) = 0.3818, and Pr(i) ≈ 0.37 for i > 3, where Pr(i)
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denotes the probability that the i-th bit can be confirmed. For each pair of known plain-image and the
corresponding cipher-image, there are three equations of the form of Eq. (1). When two known plain-images
are available, one can obtain
(
6
2
)
= 15 equations. Therefore, one can assure that most bits of {Xi}Li=1 can
be obtained with a high probability, which is larger than 1− (1−0.37)15 = 1−0.4315. It is easy to conclude
that the computational complexity on confirming bits of {Xi}Li=1 is O(L).
To verify the real performance of the above known-plaintext attack, a great number of experiments
were performed with plain-images of size 256 × 256. Here, a typical example is shown, where the se-
cret key {ri}6i=1 = {123, 57, 67, 89, 253, 221}, k1 = 38.583, k2 = 41.135, k3 = 39.846, and (x0, y0, z0) =
(0.485, 0.913, 0.751). When only the plain-image “Baboon” shown in Fig. 2a) is used to recover the approx-
imate version of the equivalent secret key of the image cipher under study, ({ri}6i=1, {Xi}Li=1, {Yi⊕Zi}Li=1),
the decryption result on another cipher-image shown in Fig. 2c) is shown in Fig. 2d). When another plain-
image shown in Fig. 2b) is used together, the decryption result on the cipher-image is shown in Fig. 2e). It
is counted that 26.53% and 83.96% of the pixels of the images shown in Fig. 2d) and Fig. 2e) are correct.
As there is strong redundancy existing in neighboring pixels of image and human eyes owns strong robust-
ness against noise in image [Zhu et al., 2015], we can even observe some important visual information from
Fig. 2d) by naked eyes. Therefore, one can conclude that two known plain-images can achieve a satisfactory
deciphering performance.
3.4. Other security flaws
In this subsection, we list three other security flaws existing widely in Logistic-map-based ciphers, which
are all reduce the complexity of deciphering the ciphers seriously.
• Low sensitivity with respect to change of secret key:
From the cryptographical point of view, a good secure image cipher should be sensitive to the secret
key [Schneier, 2007]. In [Sam et al., 2012, Sec. 4.3], the author claimed that the cipher under study has
a great sensitivity to the secret key based on some limited test results. Unfortunately, we found that
the image cipher under study fails to satisfy this security principle. From the previous analysis, one can
see that {Xi}Li=1 and {Yi ⊕ Zi}Li=1 are the equivalent key of Nonlinear and Zigzag diffusion parts. When
Y ′i ⊕ Z ′i = Yi ⊕ Zi, then Y ′i and Z ′i are equivalent to Yi and Zi, respectively. Moreover, according to
Eq. (11), (Xi, Yi ⊕ Zi) is equivalent to (Xi ⊕ 128, Yi ⊕ Zi ⊕ 128) with respect to the encryption/decryption
procedure, which means different keys may successfully decrypt cipher-images encrypted with different
secret keys.
• Low sensitivity with respect to change of plaintext:
Another cryptographical property required by a good cipher (not visual cipher) is the avalanche effect, i.e.,
the ciphertexts of two plaintexts with a slight change (e.g., only one pixel or bit is modified) should be very
dramatically different [Schneier, 2007]. However, the image cipher under study is actually far away from
the property. From the encryption procedure, there is only zigzag diffusion operation which can spread the
change to influence cipher-image, and the change of one pixel of plain-image can only influence pixels after
the present pixel with the zigzag order. For example, assume R†(L − 1) is permutated from R(i′). If the
value of R(i′) is modified, only three cipher pixels R′(L −W − 1), R′(L − 1) and R′(L) will be changed.
This flaw is very important for protecting image since a plain-image and its watermarked version may
encrypted together.
• Insufficient randomness of the keystream:
In [Sam et al., 2012, Sec. 2.2], it was claimed that MTLM does not have security issues existing in Logistic
map. Li at al. [Li et al., 2007] have shown that the randomness of pseudo-random bit sequences derived
from the Logistic map is very weak. To further test the randomness of the keystream generated by MTLM,
we tested 100 keystreams of length 256×256×3 = 196608 by using the NIST statistical test suite [Rukhin
& et al., 2010]. The 100 keystreams were generated with randomly selected secret keys. For each test, the
default significance level 0.01 was adopted. The results are shown in Table 3.4, from which one can see
that the keystream is not random enough.
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Table 1. The performed tests with respect to a significance level 0.01 and the number
of sequences passing each test in 100 randomly generated sequences.
Name of Test Number of Passed Sequences
Approximate Entropy (m = 10) 0
Block Frequency (m = 128) 0
Cumulative Sums (Forward/Reverse) 0/0
FFT 100
Frequency 0
Longest Run of Ones (m = 10000) 99
Non-overlapping Template (m = 9, B = 000000001) 0
Random Excursions (x = 1) 0
Rank 99
Runs 0
Serial (m = 16) 0
Universal 0
4. Conclusion
This paper studied the security of an image cipher based on a variant of Logistic map. Observing its
essential structure, we found that the previous chosen-plaintext attack can be further improved in terms
of reducing the number of chosen plain-images from eight-seven to two and decreasing the computational
complexity a little. Beside this, an effective known-plaintext attack can break the cipher in the sense that
only two known plain-image are needed. In addition, some other security flaws, insensitivity to change of
plaintext/secret, weak randomness of used PRNG, were identified and briefly discussed.
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Fig. 2. Known-plaintext attack: a) the known plain-image “Baboon”; b) the known plain-image “Street”; c) the cipher-image
of a plain-image “Lenna”; d) the decryption result that the equivalent secret key of diffusion part is reconstructed with the
known plain-image “Baboon”; e) the decryption result of c) with two known plain-images in a) and b).
